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AUTONOMY, CONSENT AND MEDICAL
CONFIDENTIALITY: PATIENTS' RIGHTS
IN ARGENTINA
Martin Hevia & Daniela Schnidrig*
HAT rights do patients have in light of the Argentine National
Constitution? For many years, this question was strange to Ar-
gentine constitutional practice. Respect to autonomy and pri-
vacy was not a fundamental value in Argentine society. In addition,
constitutional law used to grant primacy to "public interest" over per-
sonal opinions or values. Thus, for example, in an attempt to safeguard
the value of human life, it was justified to compel a person to accept med-
ical treatment against her will.
The paradigm shift in the conception of the Argentine constitutional
law that took place after the return of democracy in 1983 and the incor-
poration of human rights treaties in the 1994 constitutional amendment
had a positive impact on the way the relationship between doctors and
patients is now conceived.'
Firstly, the Argentine National Constitution acknowledges that people
have a right to health.2 Hence, in the Argentine legal system, it is a fun-
damental human right that is acknowledged and protected in several in-
ternational treaties and covenants incorporated in the Argentine
National Constitution in 1994.3 This explicit acknowledgement is impor-
*Executive Dean, School of Law, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella (Argentina); Law-
yer, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. This paper is a translated version of the article
"Autonomfa, consentimiento y confidencialidad mddica: los derechos de los
pacientes en el derecho constitucional argentino", published in Tratado de los
Derechos Constitucionales, Tomo II. Abeledo Perrot. Translated by Maria Laura
Serrano, revised by the authors. The best account of patients' rights after the 1994
Constitutional amendment is AiLFRuEno KRAUT, Los D7RECHOS rE LOS
PACII'NTES (1997).
1. Art. 31, CONSTrIUCION NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.).
2. Art. 41, CONST. NAC. (Arg.).
3. See art. 75.1 CONsT-. NAC. (Arg.); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 217 (II!) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(I1I), art. 3 & art. 8, (Dec. 10, 1948); Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200
(XXI) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200A(XXI), at 12.1, 12.2 (Dec. 16, 1966); Organiza-
tion of American States, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,
May 2, 1948, O.A.S. G.A. Res. XXX, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to
Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.UV/II.82, doc. 6 rev. 1
(1992); American Convention on Human Rights, art. 26, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S.
No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143 (read with remission to art. 33 of the O.A.S. Chart);
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. Doc. AIRES/34/180 (Dec. 18, 1979); Convention on the
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tant because health is a good that substantially contributes to people's
quality of life. It has an intuitive value for people, families, and commu-
nities. It is not difficult to understand why we value health. Much of
what we expect to become, individually or as community members, is
based on health. Medical care enables people to participate actively in
political, social, or economic aspects of their society. It also protects peo-
ple's possibilities to have access to many opportunities, services, and life
plans.4 The constitutional acknowledgement of the right to health serves
a good criterion to assess the state's health public policies.
Secondly, nowadays, it would be odd to hear someone say he or she is
not willing to accept or refuse any treatment proposed by his or her medi-
cal practitioner, and it would be odd to hear of someone who believes
that physicians shouldn't be bound to professional secrecy and keep to
themselves the sensitive information that patients reveal to them.
However, notwithstanding the acknowledgement of the right to health,
neither the Argentine National Constitution nor the international human
rights treaties with constitutional status expressly acknowledge patients'
rights. This acknowledgment has had its mention in case law and in some
national and local laws. Particularly, Argentina's Supreme Court case
law and other courts of justice have analyzed the scope of two rights: the
right to offer informed consent and the right to medical confidentiality.
They both reflect the importance of autonomy and patients' privacy. The
patient's right to offer her informed consent is the expression of the exer-
cise of their autonomy. At the same time, the right to confidentiality re-
flects the patient's concern for sensitive information and health that he or
she reveals to his or her medical practitioner. The decision to divulge or
not to divulge certain personal information should be left in the patient's
hands. In some circumstances, it may be necessary to violate their pri-
vacy by sharing that information-for instance, to prevent the patient
from causing damage to third parties. But the scope of this exception is
not that clear.
This article analyzes the scope of informed consent and professional
secrecy in light of the Argentine legal system, case law, and doctrine. It is
organized into three sections. In the first section, we focus on the scope of
autonomy in the Argentine legal system and its implications for the exer-
cise of the right to accept or refuse medical treatment. This section also
explains what informed consent is and how Argentina's National Su-
preme Court and other lower courts have interpreted it.
In the second section, we concentrate on patients' rights to medical
secrecy, and we discuss four questions in light of the Argentine National
Constitution, the current legislation, the national case law, and the Inter-
Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25, art. 24.2, (Nov. 20,
1989).
4. Lawrence 0. Gostin, Transforming Global Health Through Broadly Imagined
Global Health Governance, 11 REVISTA ARGENTINA iE3 TEORfA JURfDICA
[R.A.T.J.] 1, 1 (2010), available at http://www.utdt.edu/ver-contenido.php?id
contenido=6288&id item menu=5858.
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American Human Rights System. According to the Argentine National
Constitution, do health professionals have a duty to keep patients' confi-
dential information within their professional relationship? If they do, is it
an absolute duty? If that were not the case, what boundaries would be
compatible and required by the constitution? Can the professional in-
voke "public interest" to justify his or her decision to violate professional
secrecy?
Lastly, in the third section, we offer some conclusions.
I. INFORMED CONSENT AND AUTONOMY
The starting point to discuss the concept of informed consent and how
it is reflected in the Argentine legal system is the principle of personal
autonomy. According to this principle, autonomous persons have the ca-
pacity to develop their own conception of good; that is to say, the capac-
ity to have "an ordered family of final ends and aims which specifies a
person's conception of what is of value in human life or, alternatively, of
what is regarded as a fully worthwhile life. ' 5 In light of this idea, people
must be free to choose their own life plans or the pursuit of excellence,
and third parties ought not to interfere in that choice. On this basis, in
order to respect autonomy, the state should let persons pursue their own
plans because self-government is an end in itself. It is unacceptable to
invoke the person's wellbeing to interfere with his or her decisions. Who
is better than himself or herself to judge the value of his or her prefer-
ences? This liberal conception of the person is incompatible with the vi-
sion that holds that certain preferences are unacceptable and that the
community, through the state, ought to promote certain ideals of human
virtues. The principle of autonomy is accompanied by another principle,
inviolability of the person, which bans the imposition of sacrifices on a
person only to benefit others or collective entities. This principle is re-
flected in the moral prohibition to use persons as mere means for pur-
poses that are not theirs. Thus, for example, public policies could not
violate human rights, even if doing so would promote valuable collective
interests. 6
What is the scope of the principle of autonomy in the Argentine legal
system? Recently, in the Arriola decision, the Supreme Court discussed
the scope of the recognition of autonomy in the constitution and the in-
ternational treaties with constitutional status reflected in Article 19 of the
Argentine Constitution and Article 11.2 of the American Convention on
Human Rights, among other articles. 7 In general, Supreme Court justices
agreed on the idea that, according to Argentine National Constitution,
5. JOHN RAWiS, JusTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RFSTATEMENT 19 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001).
6. For a discussion on the scope of autonomy and inviolability, see CARLOS NINO,
DERECHO, MORAL Y POLfT1CA: Los EsCRITOS DE CARLOS S. NINO [LAw, MORAL-
ITY & Poi-iTics: THE: WRITINGS OF CARLOS S. NINO] 140-42 (2007).
7. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Jus-
tice], 25/8/2009, "Arriola, Sebastigin y otros s / recurso de hechos," Colleci6n
Oficial de Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [Fallos] (2009-891-1)
2014]
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the state cannot interfere in any decisions or plans that an individual may
have as long as those plans do not affect the rights of third parties.8 It is
because of this statement that the detrimental consequences of a person's
decisions regarding his or her own health do not justify the state's inter-
ference with that decision. 9 Judge Lorenzetti explained this point in the
following fashion:
... Article 19 of the National Constitution constitutes a boundary
that protects personal freedom against any type of interference inter-
ventions, including that of the State. It is not only about respecting
private actions, but also about the acknowledgement of a sphere in
which every adult individual is sovereign to decide freely about the
lifestyle they desire .... This powerful acknowledgement of personal
freedom implies an inversion of burden of proof, so that any restric-
tions to that sphere of freedom must be justified in the constitutional
legality. 10
This way of understanding the value of autonomy is also reflected in
the interpretation of Article 11 of the American Convention on Human
Rights, developed both by the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (IACHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(IACtHR). 1 Recently, for instance, the Commission has interpreted Ar-
ticle 11 as follows:
The case law of the IACHR and the Inter-American Court holds that
Article 11 of the Convention has a broad content that includes pro-
tection of the home, the private life, the family and correspondence
One fundamental purpose of Article 11 is to protect individuals from
arbitrary action by State authorities that intrude into the private
sphere. The Inter-American Court has held that "the sphere of pri-
vacy is characterized by being exempt and immune from abuse and
arbitrary invasion by third parties or public authorities . .. ."
The guarantee against arbitrariness is intended to ensure that any
such regulation (or other action) comports with the norms and objec-
tives of the Convention, and is reasonable under the circumstances.
The IACHR has observed that protection of the individual against
any arbitrary interference by public officials requires that the state
adopt all necessary legislation in order to ensure this provision's
effectiveness.
Taking account of the jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights, the IACHR has held that protection of private life
encompasses a range of factors pertaining to the dignity of the indi-
vidual, including, for example, the ability to pursue the development
(Arg.) (where the Court discussed whether forbidding the use of drugs for per-
sonal consumption was consistent with the Constitution).
8. Id. at 22.
9. Id. at 27-28.
10. Id.
11. See INT']ER-AM. COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGI-TS, RF-PORT No. 85/10 CASE- 12.361MER-
rrs GRETEI ARTAVIA MURILLo ET AL. V. COSTA RICA (2011), available at http:H
www.cidh.oas.org/demandas/ 2.361 Eng.pdf.
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of one's personality and aspirations, determine one's identity, and
define one's personal relationships.
In its case law, the European Court of Human Rights has expanded
the content of the right to have one's private life respected by pro-
viding that while the concept of "private life" covers the physical and
psychological integrity of a person, it also encompasses aspects of a
person's physical and social identity, including the right to personal
autonomy, personal development and to establish and develop rela-
tionships with other human beings and the outside world.12
In order to offer informed and full consent, it is necessary to consider
all the information related to the patient's state of health for he/she to
exercise her right of autonomy and free determination, which will be re-
flected in his or her own, rational and private decision, according to her
personal moral commitments. Therefore, it is plausible to argue that the
right to obtain information comes from Article 19 of the Argentine Na-
tional Constitution, because in order for the patient to make decisions
related to his or her health and exercise his or her autonomy, the patient
needs to have proper information. Nonetheless, while it has been ac-
knowledged in doctors' professional ethic codes that patients have rights
to offer informed consent, in Argentina, there was no official legal rule
expressing recognition of it. But in 2009, the Argentine National Con-
gress passed the Patients' Right Law 26.529.13 Article 2(f) recognizes the
patient's right to receive sanitary information relevant to his or her
health. 14 This right also includes the right to refuse receiving informa-
tion, which is restricted in cases where the physical integrity or the life of
other persons would be at risk, or for public health causes.' 5 Article 3 of
the law defines sanitary information as "that which, in a clear way, is
proper to the patient's comprehension ability, informs about her health,
the studies and treatments that were to be practiced and their foreseeable
evolution, risks, complications and fallouts," and "the therapeutic alter-
natives and their risks, and the prevention measures, their benefits and
damages."' 16
Once the patient has all the relevant information about his or her state,
the patient may take his or her own decision and exercise sovereignty
over his or her own body. The individual's right to enjoy his or her au-
tonomy through informed consent is stated in Articles 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 10
of Law 26.529 of Patients' Rights, which defines informed consent as:
[T]he adequate declaration of will, made by the patient, or by their
legal representatives if any, issued after receiving by the intervening
professional, clear, accurate and appropriate [information]....
The statutory right in case of suffering from an irreversible or incur-
able illness, or when she is in end-stage, or have suffered injuries that
12. Id. TT 69-73.
13. Law No. 26.529, Nov. 19, 2009, [31.785] B.O. 1, art. 2(f) (Arg.).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. art. 3.
2014]
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place them in the same situation, when it comes to the refusal of
surgical, hydration, nutrition, of artificial resuscitation procedures, or
to the withdrawal of vital supportive measures, when being ex-
traordinary or disproportionate in relation to improvement perspec-
tives, or that produced excessive suffering, also, the right to refuse
hydration and nutrition procedures when these produce as only ef-
fect the prolonging in time of that irreversible and incurable end-
stage.17
Nevertheless, there are requirements for valid informed consent. First
of all, only competent individuals may grant their consent.' 8 The Euro-
pean Convention on Bioethics defines an "incompetent person" as one
who does not have the capacity to express his or her consent. 19 Thus,
Article 5 of Decree 1089, which regulates Law 26.529, states that there
ought to be consent by representation:
[W]hen, according to the treating professional, the patient is not able
to make decisions, or when their physical or psychic state would not
allow her to take charge of her situation ... in the case of the legally
disabled or minors who are not intellectually or emotionally able to
understand the scopes of the practice to be authorized. 20
Although respect for the patient's autonomy is the rule, in some cases
it is reasonable to accept interferences with autonomy, such as with mi-
nors, who may not be able to form judgments, or in the case of individu-
als who suffer from cognitive incapacities. Yet, it is important to point
out that that the legal category "incompetent" may be both under- and
over-inclusive, since minors quickly develop their own identity and pref-
erences by their experiences, whereas some adults may be actually less
sophisticated and mature than some minors. 21 In any case, when it comes
to individuals who are not able to offer proper consent, either because
they are minors or because they do not have full capacity to grant it, their
opinion ought to be heard. Thus, Article 5 of Decree 1089 establishes
that the representative making the decision should only do so after hav-
ing listened to the patient's opinion, respecting the patient's dignity, and
fostering the patient's participation in the process, according to his or her
competence and discernment.22 In the case of minors, Article 12 of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child states that state parties shall as-
sure the child, who is capable of forming his or her own views, that he or
she has the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting him
or her, and that the child's views are to be given due weight in accordance
with his or her age and maturity.23 In addition, Article 3 of the Integral
17. Id. arts. 4-7, 9, 10.
18. Id. art. 5.
19. PEDRO FEDERICO HooFT, BIO1TICA, DFRECHO Y CIUDADANtA [BIOETHlics, LAW,
& CITIZENSHIP] 41 (2005).
20. Law No. 1089, July 5, 2012, [32.433] B.O. 1, arts. 5, 7, (Arg.).
21. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMrrs OF FREEDOM OF CONTRAcr, 150-51 (1993).
22. Law No. 1089, July 5, 2012, [32.433] B.O. 1, art. 5 (Arg.).
23. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25,
art. 12 (Sept. 2, 1990).
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Protection of Children and Adolescents Law 26.061 states that children
have a right have to be heard; the age, degree of maturity, discernment
capacity, and other personal conditions of the child must be respected.2 4
That is to say, even in those cases in which the person does not have full
capacity to grant informed consent, his or her participation and inclusion
in the decision-making process must be promoted, and his or her opinion
must be heard and taken into account.
A. CASE LAW ON AUTONOMY AND INFORMED CONSENT
We will now analyze the extent of autonomy when it comes to the pos-
sibility of refusing medical treatment. According to the Argentine Su-
preme Court, individuals are free to accept or refuse medical treatment,
even if it would cause their death. A paradigmatic exercise case of pa-
tient autonomy is the 1993 Supreme Court ruling in Bahamondez.2 5
Bahamondez was admitted to a hospital in Ushuaia, Province of Tierra
del Fuego because of digestive bleeding. 26 The physicians suggested a
blood transfusion.27 Bahamondez refused it because he belonged to the
religious group of Jehovah's Witnesses and a transfusion would go against
his religious beliefs. 28
The first instance judge authorized the transfusion, even against
Bahamondez's will.29 The Federal Court of Appeals confirmed this deci-
sion on the grounds that Bahamondez's decision of refusing the transfu-
sion constituted a "slow suicide, committed by a non-violent means and
not by his own hands by means of an act, but through the proper omission
of the suicidal [person]."'30 The Court argued that Bahamondez's attitude
was "nihilistic" and that an expression of individual freedom that affected
his life, that is, the "supreme good," would be unacceptable. 31
Against this first instance decision, Bahamondez interposed a writ of
certiorari ("Recurso Extraordinario Federal") based on the constitutional
right to religious freedom and the principle of reserve. 32 Bahamondez
held that he wanted to live, not to commit suicide, but that the treatment
was against his religious beliefs. 33 Although Bahamondez's medical con-
dition had been resolved without the transfusion, the case eventually
reached the Supreme Court. 34 Although the majority of the Court
thought that the matter was abstract because the patient no longer
needed the transfusion, six judges wrote their opinions about the mat-
24. Law No. 26061, Oct. 21, 2005, [30.767] B.O. 3, arts. 2, 3 (Arg.).
25. CSJN [National Supreme Court of Justice], 6/4/1993, "Bahamondez, Marcelo s/
medida cautelar," Fallos (1993-316-479) (Arg.).








34. Id. at 487.
20141
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ter.35 Judges Fayt and Barra argued that even though a ruling in this case
would be futile, Law 17.132 of Medicine Exercise, Dentistry and collabo-
ration activities (1967) favored Bahamondez's position.36 This law states
that a patient's will has to be respected even when he or she refuses to be
treated or hospitalized. 37 According to this view, Article 19 of the Argen-
tine National Constitution grants persons the right to dispose of their ac-
tions, bodies, and lives.38 The individual is attributed a realm of lordship,
subject only to his will:
"Man is the axis and the center of all the legal system and as an end in
himself-beyond his transcendent nature-his person is inviolable. Re-
spect for the human person is a fundamental, legally protected value; for
which the remaining character values are always instrumental
character. '39
In turn, Judges Cavagna, Martfnez, and Boggiano claimed that the
rights of freedom of conscience and religious freedom have been previ-
ously acknowledged by the court as rights recognized by the constitu-
tion.40 Freedom of conscience is the right to not be forced to carry out an
act that is forbidden by one's own conscience, either by religious beliefs
or moral convictions. In turn, religious freedom is a natural and inviola-
ble right, so they wrote, which implies the legal autonomy that allows
men to act freely according to their religion.41 Cavagna, Martfnez, and
Boggiano stated that the right to religious freedom entails:
[I]n its negative aspect, the existence of a sphere of immunity from
coercion on the part of individuals and groups, but also by public
authorities. This excludes every state intromission in an absolute
way, from which a forced election of a certain religious belief could
result in restricting free adherence from the principles that in con-
science, are considered right or true. 42
They also understood that there is a big difference between a defender
of euthanasia and an objector of conscience, since the practice of eutha-
nasia or mutilating operations without a therapeutic purpose constitute
"manifestations of a culture of death,"43 whereas the objector of con-
science in this case "does not seek suicide.., but only intends to maintain
the religious ideas he professes unscathed. '44 They assured, too, that
Bahamondez's behavior was self-referential as long as third parties' rights
were not affected. 45
35. See id. at 479.
36. Id. at 493.
37. Law No. 17132, Jan. 24, 1967, [21.119] B.O. 1, art. 132 (Arg.).
38. See art. 19, CONST. NAC. (Arg.).
39. "Bahamondez," supra note 25 at 494.
40. Id. at 497-98 (Martinez, J., and Boggiano, J, dissenting).
41. Id. at 497.
42. Id. at 498.
43. Id. at 499 (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 500.
45. Id.
2014] PATIENTS' RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA 523
Lastly, Judges Belluscio and Petracchi claimed that Bahamondez did
not invoke a supposed right to death or suicide, but to his personal auton-
omy. They held that, "adults' possibility that they could be able to accept
or refuse all interference in the sphere of their intimacy, is an essential
requirement for the existence of the mentioned right to individual auton-
omy, which is the very foundation of constitutional democracy. '"46
In this view, although the right to autonomy could be validly limited for
relevant public interest, "the 'right to be left alone' . . . cannot be re-
stricted just because the patient's decision may seem unreasonable or ab-
surd for society."'47
They concluded that a judicial ruling that subdued an adult to a sani-
tary treatment against his will "meant to turn Article 19 of the Magna
Carta into a mere empty formula that would only protect the intimate
realm of the conscience or those behaviors with such a scarce importance
that would not have any repercussion in the external world."'48
After the enactment of the patients' rights law, in 2012 the Supreme
Court mentioned the extent of informed consent again in the Albarracini
Nieves case, where the Court ruled similarly as in Bahamondez. 49 Pablo
Albarracini was admitted to Bazterrica Hospital in Buenos Aires. 50 He
was unconscious and the physicians established that a blood transfusion
was necessary. 51 But, as Albarracini belonged to the religious group, Je-
hovah's Witnesses, he made a statement before a public notary in 2008
where he expressed he would not accept any blood transfusions even if
his life was in danger.5 2 His father requested a cautionary measure that
would order the transfusion to be practiced. 53 The first instance court
upheld the solicited measure, considering that although Albarracini had
expressed that he refused an eventual transfusion, he was not "in a condi-
tion to make decisions with full discernment. '54
The case reached the Supreme Court, which argued that there were no
reasons to doubt the current validity of Albarracini's expression of will
and that there was no evidence that he would not have considered the
significance of his decision.5 5
The court remembered Belluscio and Petracchi's opinion in
Bahamondez and reaffirmed that "this Court has clearly established that
Article 19 of the National Constitution grants the sphere of freedom,
within which he can freely adopt fundamental decisions about himself
without any state or third party interference, as long as those decisions do
46. Id. at 505 (Belluscio, J., and Petracchi, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 506.
48. Id. at 506-07 (emphasis added).
49. CSJN [National Supreme Court of Justice], 1/6/2012, "Albarracini Nieves c. Jorge
Washington s/ medidas precautorias," La Ley [L.L.] (2012-C-483) (Arg.).
50. Id. para. 1.
51. Id.
52. Id. para. 3.
53. Id. para. 1.
54. Id. para. 4.
55. Id. paras. 9, 10.
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not violate third parties' rights. '56
In turn, the court cited the opinion of Judges Fayt and Barra in
Bahamondez, regarding the lordship that every individual has over his
persona and the right to act free from impediments. 57 The court stated
that:
The possibility of accepting or refusing a specific treatment, or select-
ing an alternative form of treatment, is part of self-determination
and personal autonomy; that patients have the right to choose op-
tions according to their own values or points of view, even when they
may seem irrational or imprudent, and that free choice must be
respected.58
Lastly, in line with the Bahamondez ruling, the court held that the free-
dom of an adult's act could be limited if there was a relevant public inter-
est at stake, which was not present in this case. 59
An important legal consequence of the court's ruling in Albarracini is
that, as it has recently been sustained, "[N]ational Law 26.742 . . . finally
clears up any doubts over the consideration of the therapeutic effort limi-
tation as 'passive euthanasia,' that has been held by some doctrine,
prompting confusion and promoting defensive medicine practices. ' 60 In
other words, it is unnecessary to obtain judicial authorization to respect
the patient's will.61 In its recent case law, the court has referred to the
absence of necessity to obtain judicial authorizations in the cases in which
the patient's health is involved: "A contra legem practice is being main-
tained, fostered by health practitioners and validated by operators of the
national and local judiciary, which ignores those precepts, requiring
(where laws require nothing), requirements like an application for
authorization. ,62
The discussion on informed consent and the right to refuse medical
treatment has also taken place in the lower courts. One of them is the
Parodi case.63 In 1995, Angel Parodi was admitted to a hospital in Mar
del Plata, Province of Buenos Aires.64 His right foot was amputated be-
cause of gangrene, which had resulted from his diabetes and alcoholism. 65
56. Id. para. 14.
57. Id. para. 15.
58. Id.
59. Id. para. 14.
60. Paula Siverino Bavio, Derechos de los pacientes y muerte digna: comentario a la ley
sobre el rechazo o la negative al soporte vital [Patients' Rights & Dignified Death:
Commentary on the Law on the Rejection or Negative to Life Support], LA LEY
127, 130 (2012), available at http://www.gracielamedina.com/assets/Uploads/Sup
lem.-Identidad-de-gnero.l.pdf.
61. See id.
62. CSJN [National Supreme Court of Justice], 13/5/2012, "F. c. A.L. s/ medida
autosatisfactiva," Fallos (2012), at para. 19 (Arg.).
63. Juzgado de Primera Instancia [1a Inst.] [Provinvial lower courts of ordinary juris-
diction], 18/9/1995, "Direcci6n del Hospital Interzonal General de Agudos
(HIGA) de Mar del Plata s/ Presentaci6n, Mar de Plata" (Arg.).
64. Id. para. 1.
65. Id. para. 3.
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Months later, he was admitted again and the physicians determined it was
necessary to amputate his left foot.6 6 In view of his refusal to amputate
his left foot, which was essential to save his life, the case reached the
Criminal Court N°3 of Mar del Plata.67 After the hospital's Bioethics
Committee were advised to respect Parodi's will, Judge Hooft claimed,
"if we do not object to the need of supplying information order to have a
valid consent for the medical intervention, we must likewise accept the
right of that patient to refuse a treatment that is considered convenient or
necessary by the health team."'68
Thus, Judge Hooft concluded that:
Under the particular circumstances of the case, proceeding with the
amputation of the second inferior limb of Patient Parodi, contraven-
ing his clear previously expressed will and being the patient consid-
ered "competent"-in the bioethics sense-would entail a serious
violation of his personal sphere of freedom, of his intimacy and pri-
vacy; in sum, a serious offense to his dignity as a human being. 69
"That is why, in this case, the "life" value (as a legally protected good),
through a medical intervention against the patient's will, cannot and must
not prevail over the principle of dignity, inherent in every human
being.'"70
A more recent example of respect of personal autonomy is that of a 74-
year-old doctor who died March 13, 2013, after being hit by a bus in the
Province of Cordoba and refusing a blood transfusion because she be-
longed to the religious group, Jehovah's Witnesses.71 The woman was
conscious when admitted to the hospital and signed a medical document
in which she asked not to be transfused. 72 Eventually, after not receiving
the necessary blood transfusion, she passed away. 73 The Bioethics Com-
mittee of the Hospital issued a statement that made it clear that, by virtue
of the Law 26.529 of Patients' Rights, they "had to admit her expression
of will."'74
In a recent case in the Province of Neuqu6n, it was difficult to prove
the patient's will because, unlike in the Albarracini Nieves case, the pa-
tient did not have a written statement indicating whether it was appropri-
ate for him to receive certain medical treatment that would keep him
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. para. 7.
69. Id. para. 8.
70. Id. para. 9.
71. Ariel Bogdanov, Muere una testigo de Jehovd por no querer recibir transfusi6n [He







526 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 20
alive.75 In this case, the patient had been in a permanent, irreversible,
vegetative state for eighteen years.76 His sisters and curators requested
the discontinuation of the vital supportive measures that maintained the
patient alive in an artificial way.7 7 The Superior Court of Justice of the
Province of Neuqu6n decided the case, invoking article 21(d) of Law
24.193, which refers to article 6 of the previously mentioned Law
26.529.78 According to this law, the sisters have standing to grant in-
formed consent in the name of their brother.79 The Superior Court in-
sisted the new regulations on patients' rights do not require the court's
legal intervention to implement the sisters' request.80 Following the Su-
preme Court's ruling in the case F.A.L, the Superior Court held that "im-
posing the legal authorization (in other words, of the state through one of
its judicial body: the Judiciary), is a violation of the principle established
in Article 19 of our National Constitution that excludes state intervention
in the individual's reserved sphere [of privacy].''81 The court added that
not requiring a legal authorization "also results in a more respectful solu-
tion of the legality principle, contained in that same principle, which
states that nobody can be forced to do what the law does not stipulate, or
be deprived of what it does not forbid, for the petitioners must not be
obliged to ask for an authorization that, in the present times, the law does
not require."' 82 On these grounds, the Superior Court concluded that it is
not appropriate to rule about the sisters' request, as the Court is not au-
thorized to do So. 8 3
In conclusion, the Supreme Court and Argentine lower courts have in-
terpreted the National Constitution and concluded that it grants patients
a wide range of choice as it regards their autonomy, reflected in their
right to refuse medical treatment.
II. THE RIGHT TO MEDICAL CONFIDENTIALITY
"I swear by Apollo Physician and Asclepius and Hygeia and Panacea
and all the gods, all the goddesses, making them my witnesses, that I
will fulfill according to my ability and my judgment, this Oath and
covenant .... [Wihat I may see or hear in the course of the treatment
or even outside of the treatment in regard to the life of men, which on
75. Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Neuqudn [Trib. Sup. Nqn.] 10/5/2012, "D.M.A. s/
declaraci6n de incapacidad," pt. I (Arg.).





81. Id. pt. III
82. Id. Courts in other jurisdictions have also followed this view. See, In re Jobes, 529
A.2d. 434 (N.J. 1987). We borrow this quote from the amicus curiae filed by the
Asociaci6n por los Derechos Civiles (ADC) in "D. M. A. S/DECLARACION DE
INCAPACIDAD" (File N' 178, 2011)).
83. Id.
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no account one must spread abroad, I will keep to myself, holding
such things shameful to be spoken about."
-Hippocratic Oath
I will respect the secrets that are confided in me, even after the
patient has died
Declaration of Geneva (according to
Amendments in 1968, 1983, 2006).84
The ethical codes of different professions establish an obligation to re-
spect professional secrecy.8 5 For example, religious ministers, account-
ants, lawyers, and healthcare professionals have an obligation to respect
professional secrecy. This obligation, however, is not always absolute.
The codes acknowledge exceptions to this general principle. In the case
of professional physicians, an absolute obligation of confidentiality could
be unacceptable in some scenarios. For example, suppose that a married
patient, who has a contagious disease, engages in sexual intercourse with
his wife without the wife knowing of the medical condition of her hus-
band. If the professional cannot waive its duty of respecting professional
secrecy to let her know about the health condition of her husband, then
she would face the risk of infection that she does not necessarily accept.
Alternatively, what would happen if a father confessed his compulsion to
beat his children? The professional could keep his confidentiality or pro-
tect the children. On the other hand, allowing exceptions to the general
principle of confidentiality could entail too much freedom for the profes-
sionals, generating fear in patients over the possibility that certain infor-
mation can be revealed to third parties or become public knowledge.
That could dissuade people from seeking medical treatments or, alterna-
tively, and directly, could make people hesitant to reveal necessary infor-
mation to receive the correct medical treatment, that is to say, the
patients could opt for lying to health professionals. 86 How does Argen-
tine law deal with situations like those mentioned in this paragraph?
To begin with, professional secrecy in general (not only that of health
professionals) is not expressly mentioned in the Argentine National Con-
stitution.87 Professional secrecy is also not expressly acknowledged by
the international treaties incorporated in the Constitution by Article 75,
subsection 22 of the Constitution.88 Nevertheless, the Argentine case law
84. Peter Tyson, The Hippocratic Oath Today, NOVA (Mar. 27, 2001), http://www.pbs
.org/wgbh/nova/body/hippocratic-oath-today.html.
85. WMA Declaration of Geneva, WORLD MEDICAi ASSOCIATION, http://www.wma
.net/en/30publications/l0policies/gl.
86. See MARGARET BRAZIER & EMMA CAVE, MEDICINE, PATIENTS, AND THE LAW 69
(4th ed. 2007).
87. Although it is connected to the right to privacy recognized in Article 19 of the
Argentine National Constitution, Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Article 11 of the American Convention on Human Rights,
among other documents, professional secrecy as a professional duty and a patient's
right is not expressly mentioned. See Art. 17, 19, CONST. NAC. (Arg.).
88. Art. 75, § 22, CONsTr. NAC. (Arg.).
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has legal norms that expressly acknowledge the right to medical secrecy.
Article 11 of Law 17.132 of the Medicine Practice, Dentistry and col-
laborative activities (1967) establishes:
Anything that would reach to the persons' knowledge, whose activity
is regulated by the present law, with a reason or about the exercise,
could not be disclosed-except on those cases in which other laws de-
termined it or when it is a question of preventing a greater wrong
and without prejudice to the provisions in the [Argentine] Criminal
Code-but to institutions, societies, magazines or scientific publica-
tions, prohibiting its facilitation or using it with propaganda pur-
poses, publicity, profit or personal benefit. 89
Article 156 of the Argentine Criminal Code sanctions those who "hav-
ing news, because of their state, profession or employment, of a secret
whose divulgation could cause harm, revealed it without a just cause." 90
The Argentine National Criminal Procedure Code also stipulates in arti-
cle 244 the obligation of those who exercise "any branch in the art of
healing" of denouncing those crimes against life and physical integrity
"except when the known facts were under professional secrecy." 91
The more recent Law 26.529 of the Patients' Rights (2010) provides in
Article 2, subsection d the right to confidentiality and reserve that the
patient has regarding any person who participates or has access in some
way to their documentation. 92 In the same line, Law 25.326 of Personal
Data Protection (2000) considers the information regarding a person's
health, as "sensitive data": Article 10 establishes the obligation to respect
professional secrecy of any person who intervenes in any stage of the per-
sonal data treatment.93
The American Convention on Human Rights, which by article 75.2 of
the Argentine Constitution 94 has constitutional status, does not expressly
establish a right to confidentiality.95 Nevertheless, IACtHR, the ultimate
Convention's interpreter, has discussed the scope in confidentiality in the
Convention and in the Inter-American human rights system. The 2004
De la Cruz Flores v. Peru judgment is paradigmatic. 96 De la Cruz Flores
and another group of physicians were arrested and accused of belonging
to a terrorist organization and of having provided medical assistance
89. Law No. 17.132, Jan. 27, 1967, [21.119] B.O. I (Arg.), available at http://www.info
leg.gov.ar/infoleglnternet/anexos/15000-19999/19429/norma.htm.
90. CODIGO PENAL [CoD. PEN.] [CRIMINAL CoD3E] art. 156 (Arg.) available at http://
www.infoleg.gov.ar/infoleglnternet/anexos/15000-19999/16546/texact.htm#19.
91. COD. PROC. PEN. [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CoiDE] art. 244 (Arg.), available at http:/
/www.infoleg.gov.ar/infoleglnternet/anexos/0-4999/383/texact.htm#9.
92. Law No. 26.742, May 9, 2012, [32.404] B.O. 1 (Arg.), available at http://www.info
leg.gov.ar/infoleglnternet/anexos/ 60000-164999/160432/norma.htm.
93. Law No. 25.326, Oct. 30, 2000, [31.965] B.O. 2 (Arg.), available at http://www.info
leg.gov.ar/infoleglnternet/anexos/60000-64999/64790/norma.htm.
94. Art. 75.2, CONST. NAC. (Arg.).
95. American Convention on Human Rights, art. 26, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36,
1144 U.N.T.S. 143.
96. De La Cruz-Flores v. Peru, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 115, (Nov. 18, 2004).
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(medicine, healings, etc.) to terrorists of that group.97 A faceless court
condemned them and, even though the rulings were withdrawn several
years later, De la Cruz Flores continued to be detained. 98 The case
reached the Inter-American Court, which based its decision on the Peru-
vian Constitution, specifically Article 2.18,99 which established the right
of every person to maintain professional confidentiality.0 0 The court
stated that confidentiality is one of the essential assumptions in the physi-
cian-patient relationship.10 1
In the case, the IACtHR argues against the criminalization of the exer-
cise of the medical profession. 10 2 To support such arguments, it mentions
several international instruments that grant special protection to the exer-
cise of the medical profession. 10 3 The IACtHR also cites principles of
humanitarian law10 4 and the Geneva Conventions.10 5 Although the court
did not decide the case on the basis of humanitarian law, the reference
has important rhetorical value. According to Article 16 of Protocol I (in-
ternational conflicts) and Article 10 of Protocol II (non-international con-
flicts) of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 "[u]nder no circumstances shall
any person be punished for carrying out medical activities compatible
with medical ethics, regardless of the person benefiting therefrom.
' 10 6
Using this particular reference, the Court clearly demonstrates its inten-
tion to render special status to medical activities.
107
97. Id. para. 3.
98. Id.
99. Id. para. 98.
100. Every person has the right to "keep his political, philosophical, religious, or any
other type of conviction private and to reserve the professional secrecy." Constitu-
ci6n Polftica del Peril, art. 2 (1993).
101. De La Cruz-Flores v. Peru, supra note 96, para. 101.
102. Id. para 74.
103. Id. para 75.
104. Id.
105. The court also cites the (i) International Code of Medical Ethics of the World
Medical Association; (ii) Regulations in time of armed conflict, World Medical
Association; (iii) Principles of European Medical Ethics; (iv) Code of Ethics and
Deontology of the Medical College of Peru (document concerning the merits and
eventual reparations and costs, volume IV, folios 846 to 857); and (v) Law, Statute,
and Regulation of the Medical College of Peru. For example, Article 12 of the
Code of Ethics and Deontology of the Medical College of Peru states that, "medi-
cal activity is every action or disposition in which the doctor engages during the
exercise of the medical profession. By this is understood: activities of diagnosis,
therapy and prognosis in which the doctor engages while attending patients, and
those [acts] that result directly from these [activities]. The medical activities men-
tioned are exclusively within the scope of the medical professional." See id.
106. Id. para. 57(b).
107. According to Article 62.3 of the American Convention on Human Rights, the
IACtHR's jurisdiction comprises all cases concerning the interpretation and appli-
cation of the provisions of this Convention. Thus, it seems that the IACtHR
quotes humanitarian law and international and local codes of Medical Ethics only
for informational purposes, because a decision by the IACtHR cannot be based on
provisions other than those of the American Convention on Human Rights. How-
ever, another explanation for these quotes is available. It may be that the IACtHR
thinks these rules have the status of peremptory norms, a fundamental principle of
international law that cannot be derogated. Thus, it may be that when determining
which standards are to be considered regarding medical confidentiality, the
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In his separate opinion, Judge Sergio Garcfa Ramfrez clearly holds that
while a physician may commit crimes that may warrant criminal sanc-
tions, the ultimate aim of the medical act is to preserve a fundamental
legal right: the right to life. 10 8 According to Garcfa Ramfrez,
One of the oldest and most noble activities is that designed to safe-
guard the life and health of the individual. In this case, what is in-
volved is the protection of the highest-ranking rights, a condition for
the enjoyment of all the others [rights]. Society as a whole has an
interest in it and the State must protect it. 1°9
Garcfa Ramfrez understands that the special legal protection of medi-
cal acts finds its basis in the social utility derived from this activity." 0 He
holds that
[T]he safeguard and development of the lives of the individual and
the group have led to identifying, encouraging and regulating the
performance of certain activities-scientific, technical, artistic, relat-
ing to public or social service, etc.-which are considered to be so-
cially useful and even necessary, and which are generally surrounded
by appropriate guarantees."'
Garcia Ramfrez expresses the importance of the State's refrain from
dissuading physicians to fulfill their duties:
If the State imposed on or authorized doctors to misuse their profes-
sion, as has occurred under totalitarian regimes, it would be just as
censurable as if it prevented them from complying with their ethical
and juridical duty, and even imposed penalties for such compliance.
In both cases the State would be harming the right to life and health
of the individual, both directly and by intimidation or restrictions im-
posed on those who, due to their profession, are regularly obliged to
intervene in the protection of those rights." 2
Garcfa Ramfrez's main concern seems to be that the State should not
dissuade doctors from fulfilling their professional obligations:
[T]he State cannot violate the protection of health and life for which
doctors are responsible, by norms or interpretations of norms that
dissuade a doctor from complying with his duty, [...] or because they
[such norms] oblige him to deviate from his proper functions and
IACtHR has to look into the internationally accepted principles in the area at
stake. Accordingly, if the court were to discuss, say, the professional ethics of
lawyers, it would appeal to international standards such as those accepted by the
International Bar Association. If this alternative account of what the IACtHR is
doing is right, it follows that this reference by the court is related to the IACtHR's
view that Peru had violated the principle of legality: given that these peremptory
norms are binding in the Peruvian legal system.
108. De La Cruz-Flores v. Peru, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 115, para. 7 (Nov. 18, 2004) (separate opinion of Judge Garcia
Ramirez).
109. Separate opinion of Judge Garcia Ramirez in De la Cruz Flores (2004) IACtHR
Series C 115, par. 6.
110. Id. para. 6.
111. Id.
112. Id. para. 7.
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assume others that enter into conflict with the former, pose unac-
ceptable dilemmas, or change the basis of the relationship between
doctor and patient, as would happen if doctors were obliged to inform
on the patients they treat. A similar situation would arise if lawyers
were forced to report the unlawful acts committed by their clients
(which they learn about through their relationship of assistance and
defense), or priests to reveal the secrets of the confessional (empha-
sis added). 113
So, just as the priest who hears confessions or the lawyer whose client
confesses having committed a crime, the physician has the duty and the
obligation to keep professional secrecy. If the state forced the physician
to reveal information, obtained in exercise of their profession, the special
protection that it has to be granted to the medical act, would not be
respected. It is the duty of the state to ensure the protection of this so-
cially useful activity, to grant guarantees to the medical act.
The IACtHR and Garcfa Ramirez's analyses concentrate on the physi-
cian's duty and right of not revealing information before that of the right
of the patients to confidentiality. The justification of the obligation of not
revealing information is based in public health and in the futile conse-
quences that would force physicians to reveal confidential information
regarding the patient's health.
The Argentine Supreme Court of Justice, the ultimate interpreter of
the Argentine Constitution, follows a similar position. In the Baldivieso
judgment, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the right to confidentiality and
analyzed its scope. 114 Csar Baldivieso was admitted to a hospital emer-
gency room in the Province of Salta, having ingested cocaine hydrochlo-
ride pills. Somehow, the information spread and reached a police agent,
presumably because the treating physicians disclosed the information.1 15
Baldivieso was sentenced to four years imprisonment for the criminal of-
fense of transporting drugs. The case finally reached the Supreme Court.
The Attorney General's verdict and that of the court analyzed the scope
of the duty of confidentiality and medical secrecy. The Attorney General
held that
Through the assurance to each and every patient that their medical
secrecy will be kept, the general good is obtained, which not only
consists of the protection of the secrets of that particular patient,
which was kept closely-guarded, but also of the general confidence
that there will be confidentiality. In this way, by strengthening this
feeling, the patients' recurrent frequency to the medical treatment is
maximized; on the contrary, it would diminish if it were not expected
that the intimate data would be privately kept. Thus, public health is
promoted.' 16
113. Id. para. 8.
114. CSJN [National Supreme Court of Justice], 4/4/2010, "Csar Alejandro Baldivieso
s/ Causa No 4733," B 436. XL. RHE. (Arg.).
115. Id.
116. See id. at 11.
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The Supreme Court adhered to the Attorney's verdict and referred to
the Natividad Frfas' plenary. It held that
In abstract, it can be understood that it is the weighting between the
right to confidentiality for every inhabitant of the Nation who re-
quires attention from a professional health care even when it in-
volves criminal behavior, as an integral part of their individual
autonomous sphere ... and the State's interest in the prosecution of
crimes. But, in concrete and in the case, it is nothing less than a per-
son's right to life and the State's interest.117
Moreover, the court highlighted the supremacy of dignity in the Argen-
tine constitutional legal system, pointing out that
The republican principle of government prevents the State from pur-
suing crimes using immoral means, as taking advantage of the immi-
nent risk of death imposed on the defendant who goes to medical
assistance, through the imposition of an obligation of the physician
to turn the defendant into an agent of the criminal State
prosecution.118
Other Argentine lower courts have also examined the value and justifi-
cations for confidentiality. The National Criminal and Correctional Ap-
peals Court, for example, bases the right to confidentiality on ethical
reasons, that is to say, on the patients' rights. Thus, it held that confiden-
tiality and medical secrecy has its foundation in the right to health and
intimacy, safeguarded in the Articles 19 and 33 of the Argentine Consti-
tution 119, and not respecting the duty of professional secrecy entails a vio-
lation of the right against self-incrimination, as well as the right to
intimacy.1 20
B. LIMITS OF PROFESSIONAL SECRECY
The Argentine legal system includes norms that refer to the limits of
respecting professional secrecy. The Argentine Penal Code sanctions in
Article 156, those who "having news, because of their state, profession or
employment, of a secret whose divulgation could cause harm, revealed it
without a just cause. 1 21 Therefore, it is important that we question our-
selves about what is "just cause." Our legal system does not determine
the scope of this concept.
117. See id. at 17 (Emphasis added).
118. Id.
119. "[P]ues es claro que la accesibilidad a un tratamiento medico adecuado depende
en gran medida de la convicci6n que pueda tener quien concurre a la asistencia de
que su confianza serd retribuida y su intimidad respetada." ["[I]t is clear that ac-
cess to adequate medical treatment depends largely on the belief that those who
attend to you will be trusted to respect privacy."] See Poder Judicial de la Naci6n,
30/4/2009, "Mufi6z Alcala, Paulino s/ causa no 41.557," Juzg. Fed. n/ 6 - Secret. n/
11 (Arg.).
120. See C. Nac. Civ. y Com. Fed., Sala VI, "S. A. E.", 23/10/2007. (Arg.).
121. COD. PEN. [CRIMINAL CODE] art. 156 (1984) (Arg.).
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While confidentiality is a right and an obligation from the physicians'
side, it cannot have an absolute character. According to the IACHR, no
right acknowledged in the Convention is absolute: acknowledging abso-
lute rights would be contrary to the aim of the American Convention-to
protect human rights generally. 1 22 According to the IACtHR, for a re-
striction of a right to be legitimate, it (i) must be taken in response to "an
urgent social need" and directed towards "satisfying an imperative public
interest"; (ii) must employ the least restrictive alternative, i.e., the availa-
ble means which least jeopardizes the protected right; and (iii) must be
"proportional to the interest [that it seeks to protect] and must adjust
itself to the achievement of this legitimate objective."'1 23
To understand the scope of "just cause," it is useful to explore solutions
in other systems. Two famous pioneer cases come from California and
Canada. In Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, the Su-
preme Court of California held that the duty of medical confidentiality is
implicitly subordinated to the physician's obligation to protect third par-
ties when the doctor knows that his/her patient will seriously injure an-
other person. 24 The notoriety of this case can be attributed to, among
other things, the maxim that "the privilege of protection ends where a
public threat begins. '125 In turn, in a famous Canadian case, the Su-
preme Court of Canada adopted a similar standard, identifying three fac-
tors to decide whether a doctor may abrogate her duties of
confidentiality: 1) there must be a clear risk to a person or identifiable
group; 2) the risk must involve serious physical injury or death; 3) the risk
must be imminent. 126 More recently, in Colombia, the Constitutional
Court held that in extreme situations medical secrecy must be revealed to
prevent the consummation of a serious crime. 27
122. See Artavia Murillo et al. ("In vitro fertilization") v. Costa Rica, Merits, Repara-
tions, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, $ 259 (Nov. 28,
2012).
123. La Colegiaci6n Obligatoria de Periodistas (arts. 13 and 29), Advisory Opinion OC-
5/85, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 5, % 46 (Nov. 13, 1985). Additionally, in the
international human rights system, we find the Siracusa Principles on the Limita-
tions and Derogation of Provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights ("Siracusa Principles"). Although the Siracusa Principles are not
binding, they have important persuasive force because they establish functional
guidelines to rightfully limit fundamental human rights enshrined in the United
Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. For instance, the
Siracusa Principles have been used as standards by international organizations,
such as the World Health Organization. United Nations, Economic and Social
Council, Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4,
Annex (1985), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4672bc122.html.
124. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of California,551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
125. Id. at 347.
126. Smith v. Jones, [1999] S.C.R. 455 (Can.).
127. Corte Suprema De Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala de Casaci6n Penal junio
9, 2005, M.P: Jorge Anibal G6mez Gallego, Proceso No. 20134, Aprobado Acta
No. 49 (Colom.).
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In Argentina, the majority of the courts follow the Natividad Frias128
precedent, which impedes the instigation of criminal charges against a
woman who attends a hospital after having an abortion. 129 Natividad
Frias famously held that
A report filed by a health professional who learnt of the abortion
while exercising his or her official or unofficial duties is not valid to
initiate a criminal procedure against the woman who has caused her
own abortion or allowed someone else to cause it. The report, how-
ever, is valid to initiate a criminal procedure against the perpetrator of
the abortion, as well as the co-perpetrators, instigators and accesso-
ries." In turn, this statement is based on the constitutional guarantee
against self-incrimination, stated in article 18 of the Argentine Na-
tional Constitution: "No inhabitant of the Nation ... may be com-
pelled to testify against himself, nor be arrested except by virtue of a
written warrant issued by a competent authority. The defense by trial
of persons and rights may not be violated .... 130
The National Supreme Court discussed the scope of "just cause" on
two occasions. In 1997, in Zambrana Daza, the court analyzed the case
of a woman who had been admitted to hospital with a stomach ulcer
caused by transporting illicit drugs in her stomach. 131 The assisting physi-
cian reported her to the police. When discussing the scope of profes-
sional secrecy, the Supreme Court held
[R]eference was made from a previous court that asserts that the
public function of a public hospital physician did not relieve her from
the obligation of keeping professional secrecy and constitutes, ac-
cording to this court, an unreasonable treatment of the controversy
in accordance with applicable legal provisions as they are crimes of
public action, a court file must be opened in all cases, not having
previewed any exceptions to the obligation of denouncing of a public
officer, as the exception to the obligation mentioned... is not ex-
128. C~imara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Criminal y Correccional de Capital Fed-
eral, en Pleno (CNCrimCorr), 26/8/1966, "Natividad Frias," Jurisprudencia Argen-
tina [J.A.] (1966-V-69). It should be noted that Natividad Frias is problematic
because, although it clearly states that women cannot be prosecuted on the basis of
a report by a doctor, the ruling does not address the most fundamental issue at
stake: whether the ban on certain type of abortions entails a violation of a wo-
man's right to health.
129. See Mercedes Cavallo, Derecho y Deber de Confidencialidad: Desafios para el
Ejercicio de los Derechos Sexuales y Reproductivos en Amrica Latina [Right &
Duty of Confidentiality: Challenges for the Exercise of Sexual & Reproductive
Rights in Lat. Am.], 13 REVIsTA ARGENTINA DE! TEORfA JURIDICA [R.A.T.J.]
(Jun. 13, 2009) (explaining that Natividad Frias is the ruling followed by the major-
ity of the courts in Argentina, both because it is a plenary decision and because it
seems to protect women and to punish the providers of illegal abortions). See also
Emiliano Villa, Secreto Profesional y. Obligacion de Denunciar: un andlisis de la
Jurisprudencia Argentina [Professional Secrecy & Obligation to Report: An Analy-
sis of the Argentina Jurisprudence], 13 RIuVISTA ARGENTINA DE TEORfA JURfDICA
[R.A.T.J.] (Jun. 13, 2009).
130. See "Natividad Frias," supra note 128.
131. CSJN [National Supreme Court of Justice], 12/8/1997, "Zambrana Daza, Norma
Beatriz s/ infraccion a la ley 23.737," Fallos (Z-17-XXXI), para. 2 (Arg.).
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tended to authorities or public officers.132
The Supreme Court's Zambrana Daza decision caused uncertainty
over the scope of the duty of confidentiality. 133 In 2010, with new infor-
mation, the Court addressed the scope of confidentiality in the aforemen-
tioned Baldivieso case.1 34 The Court concluded that, according to article
177 of the Criminal Code, medical secrecy must only give in to criminal
cases against the right to life or physical integrity.1 35 In case of a conflict
between the patient's intimacy and the state's legitimate interest in crime,
the prosecution is less critical than the protection of general confidence in
the medical community's reputation as a promoter of the public health
system.
In conclusion, according to Supreme Court case law, as a rule, the right
to confidentiality and the duty to keep medical secrecy could be under-
mined only in exceptional circumstances such as threat to the life or phys-
ical integrity of third parties, but not for the mere invocation of a public
interest in prosecuting crimes. In other words, "just cause" is to be un-
derstood restrictively.
III. CONCLUSION
We have analyzed the scope of patients' right to their personal auton-
omy in light of the Argentine legal system, case law and doctrine. In light
of our analysis, we can conclude that, in Argentina, the state must con-
sider and respect persons as ends in themselves. Ultimately, the main
point of the first part of the paper is to show that the state ought to re-
spect the fact that individuals may have views on how they prefer to die,
which may, at the same time, be part of a more comprehensive account of
the good life. 136 In turn, regarding the patients' right and the physicians'
duty to preserve medical confidentiality in Argentina, health profession-
als have a duty to keep the information that the patients reveal to them
secret when there is a professional relationship between the two, but this
is not an absolute duty. The Argentine legal system establishes "just
cause" as the exception to the duty to keep medical secrecy. We have
defined the standard of "just cause" in light of the Argentine Supreme
Court case law. This exception is limited to cases in which relevant public
interests were at stake-understood as risk to the life or integrity of third
parties.
Patients' rights in Argentina, its scope and application, continue to con-
stantly develop and advance. As we've seen in this paper, the Argentine
legal system has established rules that widely protect patients' autonomy
132. Id. para. 3.
133. CoD. PEN. [CRIMINAL CODE] art. 177 (1984) (Arg.). That was not the case in
Baldivieso.
134. See "Baldivieso," supra note 114, at 10.
135. Id.
136. EDUARDO RIVERA Lomz, PROBLEMAS DE VIDA O MUERTE. DIEz ENSAYOS DE
BIOvTICA [PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND DEATH: TEN TRIALS OF BIOETHICS] 72 (2011).
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and dignity. Nevertheless, facing the future, it would be desirable to
translate into expressed legal provisions the scope of certain legal con-
cepts like "just cause" in a way according to the development in the case
law to prevent unnecessary controversies over the scope of patients'
rights.
